E229Lt
05-21-2005, 11:00 PM
9/11 and the Cowboy Issue
Many years ago the New York Fire Department began a process of classifying buildings into types and from that observation they developed a written strategy to cope with any potential fire or emergency by simply applying the tenets of a given tactic to the type of structure involved. One of the first of these was “Old Law Tenements.” Using the experience of generations of firefighters and adding the innovative options provided by newer equipment and other learned factors; a book of tactics and procedures on Old Law Tenements was initiated.
So successful was this project that a Battalion Chief arriving late on the scene of a developing fire in an Old Law Tenement could immediately appraise the success of the effort of the first responders by observing the effort and listening to the communications and comparing that to his normal expectations as described in the book; this, even if he had never witnessed a fire in an Old Law Tenement in his career.
The language of the book is terse and direct with literally no options other than to be in harms way. Simple sentences like, “The first due engine shall proceed to the fire floor and begin their attack…” commits the first due officer to the fray and those that will follow have equally severe tasks to assume. There are no escape clauses. One will not find sentences that begin with a ‘however’ or a ‘but’. There are few adverbs and no adjectives. All of the books are filled with the words, ‘shall’ and ‘will’, as in the sentence above.
The company that takes its line above the first line to attack and protect the floor above knows that the first due engine will never leave their position. That is not written in any book because it is a well honed tradition of that organization that companies and personnel totally depend upon each other and such attitudes do not have to be written; yet they are firmly ingrained. The combination of written guidelines married to direct experience coupled with that proven tradition of courage and tenacity is the signature of the New York City Fire Department. When one adds to this entity a system that continues to produce an employee of the highest caliber that civil service tests can produce, the citizens of New York can be justly proud of the reputation that has been honestly earned.
Each operation is dependent upon each company applying themselves with firm vigor and commitment. The arriving Battalion Chief then becomes somewhat like a conductor of an orchestra, coordinating the companies by following the script which he knows well and which most often has been reinforced by experience.
An observer looking upon the scene of a fully developed fire in an old law tenement would no doubt think that the effort has some of the flair of spontaneity so fierce and intense is the activity of the attack. Only the true professional, and certainly the officer in command, can see the order, the fluidness, and the level of proficiency in the drama before him. With him is always the knowledge that despite the training and the capability of the members on the scene, terrible things can go wrong in a moment. It is one of the reasons why he is there.
High Rise buildings also have fallen into a separate category and they too have been described and captured into a rather large book of tactics and procedures that are considerably more complicated in their application than is the tenement book.
However, the tactics and procedures for all of the different types of buildings have at least one thing in common; every attack on a fire building begins on the floor below the fire. It is there where the teams get ready for the coming battle, it is there where the lines are drawn and the movement toward resolution truly begins.
Underneath it all, well below the cackling of the radios and the almost audible terror of the fleeing public conveyed to those who responded on 9/11, was the grim understanding that somewhere there will be a floor below and we will find it and then we will attack.
Simply put, again using a broad brush approach to a complicated problem, the Fire Department was going to find the lowest floor from which to launch an attack that was from the outset fraught with danger and its counterpart, deep anxiety.
When one puts buildings into categories, the tactics that ensue are dependent on certain assumptions and not the least of these is common structural features of a given structure with another. It is unfortunate that this factor, which led to an assumption that the World Trade Center was consistent with other high rise buildings, was so fatally flawed. Yet, there was no reason to make any other assumption on the morning of 9/11.
Had those planes launched themselves into any other two high rise buildings in that area (let us say 130 Liberty St and another), they would have had an excellent chance of surviving the onslaught and eventually the fire would have been extinguished using the same tactics applied at the Twin Towers.
There would have been no cry of “cowboys” to characterize their effort because their effort would have succeeded. It must be everyone’s hope that this style of activity will continue.
The observer who used the phrase “cowboy” to describe the activity is not unlike the observer of the tenement fire as described above. He cannot see what is in front of him because he does not know what he is looking at.
Warm regards,
Tom Brennan
Retired Captain NYFD
Many years ago the New York Fire Department began a process of classifying buildings into types and from that observation they developed a written strategy to cope with any potential fire or emergency by simply applying the tenets of a given tactic to the type of structure involved. One of the first of these was “Old Law Tenements.” Using the experience of generations of firefighters and adding the innovative options provided by newer equipment and other learned factors; a book of tactics and procedures on Old Law Tenements was initiated.
So successful was this project that a Battalion Chief arriving late on the scene of a developing fire in an Old Law Tenement could immediately appraise the success of the effort of the first responders by observing the effort and listening to the communications and comparing that to his normal expectations as described in the book; this, even if he had never witnessed a fire in an Old Law Tenement in his career.
The language of the book is terse and direct with literally no options other than to be in harms way. Simple sentences like, “The first due engine shall proceed to the fire floor and begin their attack…” commits the first due officer to the fray and those that will follow have equally severe tasks to assume. There are no escape clauses. One will not find sentences that begin with a ‘however’ or a ‘but’. There are few adverbs and no adjectives. All of the books are filled with the words, ‘shall’ and ‘will’, as in the sentence above.
The company that takes its line above the first line to attack and protect the floor above knows that the first due engine will never leave their position. That is not written in any book because it is a well honed tradition of that organization that companies and personnel totally depend upon each other and such attitudes do not have to be written; yet they are firmly ingrained. The combination of written guidelines married to direct experience coupled with that proven tradition of courage and tenacity is the signature of the New York City Fire Department. When one adds to this entity a system that continues to produce an employee of the highest caliber that civil service tests can produce, the citizens of New York can be justly proud of the reputation that has been honestly earned.
Each operation is dependent upon each company applying themselves with firm vigor and commitment. The arriving Battalion Chief then becomes somewhat like a conductor of an orchestra, coordinating the companies by following the script which he knows well and which most often has been reinforced by experience.
An observer looking upon the scene of a fully developed fire in an old law tenement would no doubt think that the effort has some of the flair of spontaneity so fierce and intense is the activity of the attack. Only the true professional, and certainly the officer in command, can see the order, the fluidness, and the level of proficiency in the drama before him. With him is always the knowledge that despite the training and the capability of the members on the scene, terrible things can go wrong in a moment. It is one of the reasons why he is there.
High Rise buildings also have fallen into a separate category and they too have been described and captured into a rather large book of tactics and procedures that are considerably more complicated in their application than is the tenement book.
However, the tactics and procedures for all of the different types of buildings have at least one thing in common; every attack on a fire building begins on the floor below the fire. It is there where the teams get ready for the coming battle, it is there where the lines are drawn and the movement toward resolution truly begins.
Underneath it all, well below the cackling of the radios and the almost audible terror of the fleeing public conveyed to those who responded on 9/11, was the grim understanding that somewhere there will be a floor below and we will find it and then we will attack.
Simply put, again using a broad brush approach to a complicated problem, the Fire Department was going to find the lowest floor from which to launch an attack that was from the outset fraught with danger and its counterpart, deep anxiety.
When one puts buildings into categories, the tactics that ensue are dependent on certain assumptions and not the least of these is common structural features of a given structure with another. It is unfortunate that this factor, which led to an assumption that the World Trade Center was consistent with other high rise buildings, was so fatally flawed. Yet, there was no reason to make any other assumption on the morning of 9/11.
Had those planes launched themselves into any other two high rise buildings in that area (let us say 130 Liberty St and another), they would have had an excellent chance of surviving the onslaught and eventually the fire would have been extinguished using the same tactics applied at the Twin Towers.
There would have been no cry of “cowboys” to characterize their effort because their effort would have succeeded. It must be everyone’s hope that this style of activity will continue.
The observer who used the phrase “cowboy” to describe the activity is not unlike the observer of the tenement fire as described above. He cannot see what is in front of him because he does not know what he is looking at.
Warm regards,
Tom Brennan
Retired Captain NYFD